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Abstract 
 
Like all natural hazards, space weather exhibits occasional extreme events over 
timescales of decades to centuries. Historical events provoked much interest, and 
sometimes alarm, because bright aurora becomes visible at mid-latitudes. However, they 
had little economic impact because the major technologies of those eras were not 
sensitive to space weather. This is no longer true. The widespread adoption of advanced 
technological infrastructures over the past fifty years has created significant sensitivity. 
So these events now have the potential to disrupt those infrastructures – and thus have 
profound economic and societal impact. However, like all extreme hazards, such events 
are rare, so we have limited data on which to build our understanding of the events. This 
limitation is uniquely serious for space weather since it is a global phenomenon. Many 
other natural hazards (e.g. flash floods) are highly localised, so statistically significant 
datasets can be assembled by combining data from independent instances of the hazard 
recorded over a few decades. Such datasets are the foundation on which reliable risk 
assessment methodologies are built. But we have a single instance of space weather so 
we would have to make observations for many centuries in order to build a statistically 
significant dataset. We show that it is not practicable to assess the risk from extreme 
events using simple statistical methods. Instead we must exploit our knowledge of solar-
terrestrial physics to find other ways to assess these risks. We discuss three alternative 
approaches: (a) use of proxy data, (b) studies of other solar systems, and (c) use of 
physics-based modelling. We note that the proxy data approach is already well-
established as a technique for assessing the long-term risk from radiation storms, but does 
not yet provide any means to assess the risk from severe geomagnetic storms.  This latter 
risk is more suited to the other approaches, but significant research is needed to make 
progress. We need to develop and expand techniques to monitoring key space weather 
features in other solar systems (stellar flares, radio emissions from planetary aurorae). 
And to make progress in modelling severe space weather, we need to focus on the 
physics that controls severe geomagnetic storms, e.g. how can dayside and tail 
reconnection be modulated to expand the region of open flux to envelop mid-latitudes? 
1 Background 
 
Over the past decade space weather has developed strongly as a scientific discipline that 
can help to address the challenges that the space environment poses to our technological 
civilization. The impact of space weather on technology has been known since the mid-
nineteenth century, e.g. through the impact of geomagnetically-induced currents on 
telegraph systems. However, our scientific understanding of the processes that cause 
these impacts has emerged only in the past few decades, mainly through our growing 
appreciation of the plasma processes that dominate the space environment (e.g. the nature 
of the solar wind and the role of magnetic reconnection). 
 
In parallel with these scientific developments, our civilization has greatly increased its 
sensitivity to space weather over the past forty years as technological systems have 
become more critical to the functioning of economies and societies around the world. In 
particular two particular sensitivities stand out as critical at this time. 
 
1. Our dependence on space-based systems, both public and commercial, for a range of 
critical services including communications, navigation, meteorology, environment 
and security monitoring. It is now widely recognized that these systems are at risk 
from the natural space environment as well as human factors – and that the 
assessment and mitigation of that risk should be a matter of public policy because of 
the societal importance of these systems. The policy response in the US, and now in 
Europe, has been to establish space situational awareness (SSA) programmes. These 
programmes seek to develop services that provide public and private sector users with 
awareness of the space environment and its impact on their activities, e.g. operation 
and exploitation of space-based systems. Space weather is a key element in the SSA 
programmes through its effects on spacecraft (e.g. radiation, charging, drag) and on 
their radio links (e.g. phase shifts and scintillation arising from transmission through 
the ionosphere and plasmasphere). 
2. Our deep dependence on electrical power. This has gathered pace over the last forty 
years, e.g. with the greatly reduced use of coal as a fuel for railways, factories and 
domestic heating and the use of large-scale power grids to deliver power from low-
cost sources distant from consumers. Space weather can interfere with this through 
the production of geomagnetically induced currents in the solid body of the Earth. 
These can enter power grids through earth connections and reduce delivered power by 
unbalancing grid operation. In the worst cases, they can degrade and destroy devices 
such transformers through vibration and heating. The prime example of this hazard is 
the power grid failure in Quebec in 1989. This acted as a wake-up call and the power 
industry in regions of high risk (e.g. North America) has worked to reduce the hazard 
by maintaining awareness of the threat and taking procedural action, e.g. reducing 
long-distance transmission of power during periods of risk. Nonetheless the space 
weather threat is still significant, e.g. through extreme events beyond the capability of 
existing mitigation procedures and through the lack of awareness when new power 
grids are developed. 
 
Other critical sensitivities are likely to appear in the future as new technologies are 
exposed to space weather. One emerging candidate is the potential of solar energetic 
particle events to disrupt digital systems on the ground. Chip vendors now advise that 
cosmic radiation is the main source of error in digital systems and that design of critical 
systems must allow for this. Major SEP events are known to increase ground-level 
radiation many-fold – the largest known case being factor 50 (Marsden et al., 1956; Gold 
and Palmer, 1956). Another candidate is the possibility that bursts of intense radio noise 
from the Sun could interfere with many modern wireless technologies (e.g. mobile/cell 
phones, wireless control systems, wireless internet). The latter is very similar to another 
early impact of space weather: UK scientists working on radar systems during the Second 
World War discovered that mysterious interference in those systems originated from 
solar radio emissions and not, as they had first feared, from hostile action (Hey, 1946, 
Lanzerotti et al, 2005). 
 
Space weather, like the normal weather in the Earth’s troposphere, is episodic. It 
experiences long periods of quiet conditions when impacts on technological systems are 
small interspersed with periods of disturbed conditions which have modest impacts. 
Extreme events are rare but do happen and it is during these events that the sensitivity of 
technological systems will be most starkly revealed. A key issue therefore is to estimate 
what is the extreme risk that society should plan for: what is the frequency occurrence of 
extreme space weather events? - and what are the potential consequences of such events? 
The paper outlines the current state of knowledge on such events and argues that further 
scientific research is critical to establishing an adequate knowledge base on extreme 
space weather. It also proposes some possible approaches to that future research and 
explores their strengths and weaknesses. 
2 Space weather as a natural hazard 
This paper treats space weather as an emerging natural hazard. This is an important step 
in distinguishing the study of space weather from the more general study of the space 
environment (e.g. as solar and solar-terrestrial physics). A key issue in defining natural 
hazards is the interaction of the natural environment with human beings and the 
infrastructures that they have built. To qualify as a natural hazard an environmental event 
must have the potential to affect people or their activities; an event that does not affect 
people is purely of academic interest and is not a hazard. 
 
The risk from space weather is largely focused on the reliable and safe operation of 
technologies that enable human activities. There are only limited direct threats to human 
health – mainly through radiation effects and even then only because technology 
(aviation and spaceflight) allows humans to travel in regions where there is an enhanced 
risk from cosmic radiation. There is some scientific speculation that space weather can 
have other effects on human health (Palmer et al, 2006) but this is remains an intriguing 
idea for which this is no scientific consensus. The major impacts of space weather are 
those on human technologies. These have gradually emerged over the past 150 years 
starting with the development of telegraph and its vulnerability to geomagnetically-
induced currents. Space weather impacts have gathered pace over the past fifty years, e.g. 
through the deployment of critical infrastructures in space, through the ubiquitous use of 
electrical power and radio-based systems and, most recently, the embedding of software 
controls in a vast range of technologies. It is this growth in the use of vulnerable 
technologies that marks space weather as an emerging natural hazard that should be 
considered alongside more traditional examples. 
 
Those traditional hazards illustrate the concept of natural hazards. They typically arise 
when adverse conditions occur as occasional events in environments that are generally 
benign. For examples there is often a physical correlation between the general fertility of 
a region and the risk of occasional dangerous events. Examples include (a) river valleys 
where the availability of water for agriculture is correlated with the risk of flooding, (b) 
sea coasts where the availability of seafood should be balanced against the risk of 
flooding by storm surges and by tsunamis, and (c) the margins of volcanoes, where the 
high soil fertility is correlated with the risk from lava and ash. Natural hazards occur in 
places in that are good to live, except on those few occasions when conditions deviate far 
from the norm. 
 
Space weather is similar in that humankind has necessarily evolved on a planet that is 
favourable to the development of life. The Earth sits at a comfortable distance from the 
Sun in what is now termed the “Habitable zone” by astronomers studying the potential 
for life on exo-planets. A planet orbiting in this zone is likely to have surface 
temperatures that allow the presence of liquid water, an important factor for life. 
However, the potential for life also depends on several factors increasingly familiar to the 
solar-planetary physics community, and now gaining visibility in exo-planet studies 
(Khodachenko, et al, 2009). 
• The need for a benign radiation environment such that living organisms can 
reproduce with only minor chance of mutation from generation to generation. Life on 
Earth is protected from the severity of cosmic radiation by a number of factors: (a) 
the scattering of galactic cosmic rays by magnetic structures in the solar wind, (b) the 
deflection of solar energetic particles and low energy (<10 GeV) cosmic rays by the 
geomagnetic field and (c) the absorption of the latter particles by the relatively thick 
so atmosphere. These factors all work together such that cosmic radiation provides 
only 10% of the natural radiation exposure at sea level on Earth and becomes the 
dominant source only at high altitudes (>3000 m above sea level).  
• The need to protect planetary atmosphere from erosion by the stellar wind. Over 
billions of years this can provide sufficient momentum to remove the atmosphere – 
but only if that momentum can be coupled into the planetary atmosphere. On Earth 
the geomagnetic field creates the magnetosphere, a diamagnetic cavity that holds the 
solar wind away from the bulk of the atmosphere. Some momentum coupling occurs 
as a result of magnetopause reconnection and ion-neutral coupling in the high latitude 
ionosphere – and significant outflows have been reported from this region (Lockwood 
et al, 1985, Ogawa et al, 2003, Engwall et al., 2009).  
 
But these factors that give Earth its potential for life are also ones that expose it to space 
weather hazards. Its relative closeness to the Sun is essential for life, but also means that 
it is exposed to the environmental effects that constitute space weather. For example, the 
solar X-rays and UV fluxes that drive many ionospheric space weather effects follow the 
inverse square law, so their variations at Earth will be tens or hundreds of times greater 
than amongst the outer planets such as Jupiter and Neptune. Similar considerations apply 
to other space weather drivers such as the energy and momentum fluxes in the solar wind 
and also to the fluxes of solar energetic particles (though the latter’s radial variation will 
modified by particle scattering and shock acceleration at structures away from the Sun). 
Nonetheless it is clear that Earth’s closeness to the Sun is one factor in creating the risk 
from space weather. 
 
Another factor that raises the space weather hazard at Earth is the magnetosphere. As 
discussed above, this can act as a shield protecting much of the Earth from the solar wind 
and solar energetic particles. But it can also act as a solar wind energy collector - when 
magnetopause reconnection occurs and thus allows solar wind energy to cross the 
magnetopause. Since the cross-section of the magnetosphere is hundreds of times greater 
than that of the Earth itself, so this process can collect much more solar wind energy 
(compared to an unmagnetised planet) and focus it in the polar regions (whereas the 
energy input would spread over the whole dayside hemisphere in the case of an 
unmagnetised planet). A key consequence of this focused energy input is heating the 
polar upper atmosphere, which has profound impacts on atmospheric behaviour at all 
latitudes: (a) it can reverse the pattern of upper atmosphere winds so that they flow away 
from the heated polar regions rather than the sub-solar region of the dayside, (b) it can 
change the composition of the upper atmosphere through enhanced vertical transport, and 
(c) variations in the polar energy input can generate large-scale acoustic gravity waves 
that propagate to lower latitudes. These changes in atmospheric behaviour give rise to 
well-known space weather problems such as changes in atmospheric drag on spacecraft 
and a wide range of changes in ionospheric behaviour. The solar wind energy input also 
generates the aurora and associated space weather effects such as spacecraft charging in 
low polar orbits, enhanced ionospheric scintillation at high latitudes, high variability in 
HF radio propagation conditions on trans-polar routes and geomagnetically induced 
currents (GIC) in power grids, pipelines and signalling systems. 
3 Some examples of severe space weather events 
In this section we present some examples of severe space weather events to illustrate 
what we know of their impacts and what we know of the physics of such events. These 
examples are not intended to be a complete catalogue but rather a subset that illustrates 
the extent of our knowledge. To rank the severity of geomagnetic activity in these events 
we use the aa*MAX index developed at the US National Geophysical Data Center. This 
index is based on the well-known aa geomagnetic index, but uses a running mean 
technique to provide a robust estimate of the overall strength of any storm. For more 
details of this index see Appendix A.  
 
We first consider a number of major events recorded over the past forty years a period for 
which there is reasonable data coverage by both ground-based and space-based sensors:  
 
13 March 1989.  This is the most notable event of the past forty years. It has, by far, the 
largest value of aa*MAX (441) in that period. Indeed it ranks highest in the whole series 
of aa*MAX values. The next strongest events are those of 18 September 1941 (aa*MAX 
= 429) and 23 March 1940 (aa*MAX = 377). However, we have very limited information 
on the space weather impacts arising during those earlier events. Much of the present 
technological sensitivity to space weather did not then exist – and what interest did exist 
was often focused on specialist niches such as radio communications. In contrast, the 
1989 event attracted much interest because of its space weather impacts, so there is 
substantial information on these. Most notable was the power failure in Quebec, which 
acted as a major wake-up call for those concerned with space weather effects on power 
grids. Since that time, much has been done to mitigate the risk, e.g. through improved 
operational procedures in areas known to be at risk such New England. The 1989 event 
was also notable for the changes in atmospheric drag, which caused the US space 
surveillance activities (then operated as NORAD) to loose track of over 1600 space 
objects. The March 1989 was less notable for its enhanced radiation fluxes and were 
over-shadowed by major solar radiation storms in October 1989, which did not generate a 
large magnetic storm. 
 
29 October 2003. This event marked the peak of the so-called Halloween storms of 2003. 
It has aa*MAX = 332, the second highest value of the past 40 years and 9th highest since 
records started in 1868. The Halloween storms have attracted much attention because 
they are the strongest storms observed with the comprehensive space-based 
measurements that emerged in the 1990s under the auspices of the International Solar-
Terrestrial Physics programme (Whipple and Lancaster, 1995). A wide range of space 
weather impacts were reported. There were many problems with spacecraft operations, 
e.g. control anomalies due to single event effects, loss of data due to space weather 
interference with sensors. An interesting example was the loss of stable magnetic 
orientation in geosynchronous orbit and thus the need to disable spacecraft sub-systems 
that rely on that stable field. There was also considerable space weather interference with 
high-frequency radio communications, especially in polar regions. This required the re-
routing of trans-polar flights in the Arctic and use of backup communications for groups 
working in the Antarctic. Interference with radio communications was also reported in 
other frequency ranges – typically when activity occurred on the Sun while it was aligned 
with the main beam or major side lobes of the receiving antenna. The impact on power 
grids was noticeably less than in 1989, especially in North America where operators 
applied the lessons learned in 1989. Some problems were reported in Northern Europe 
and South Africa, in particular overheating of transformers. One special feature of this 
event was the occurrence of significant space weather effects on space missions well 
away from Earth, e.g. the failure of the radiation monitor on NASA’s Mars Odyssey 
mission and severe interference in the star trackers on ESA’s Mars Express mission. 
 
8 February 1986. This event ranks 20th highest in the record of aa*MAX values from 
1868, and fourth highest of the past forty years, with aa*MAX = 287. The key lesson 
learned about this event was its occurrence close to the solar minimum (which occurred 
in March 1986), providing a clear demonstration that the solar cycle has only a statistical 
influence on the frequency of severe events; they are rare during solar minimum, but not 
impossible. 
 
Unfortunately these three recent events provide only limited scientific insights into what 
makes a severe space weather event. All three events were reasonably well-observed by 
ground-based sensors such magnetometer networks. To give one example, Figure 1 
shows the variation of the four auroral electrojet indices during the 1989 event. The shape 
of the variations is not unusual and a series of perhaps ten sub-storms can be seen 
following the sudden commencement at 01:28 on 13 March and ending as activity died 
down on late on 14 March. What is unusual in this plot is the scale – an order of 
magnitude larger than usually used to plot these indices. This demonstrates the intensity 
of the event. The auroral electrojet indices for the 1986 and 2003 events exhibit similar 
behaviour. 
 
Unfortunately none of these events were well-observed by space-borne sensors. In 
particular, there is limited information on the variations of the solar wind and the 
heliospheric magnetic field during the event. As discussed above the 1986 and 1989 
events pre-date the current era of comprehensive space measurements. At that the only 
spacecraft that made routine measurements of solar wind and heliospheric magnetic field 
was NASA IMP-J spacecraft – and these measurements were constrained by the 
spacecraft orbit and limited downlink capacity. As a result there are no useful data from 
the 1989 event. There are some data for the 1986 event but these are sparse and disjointed 
so it is very difficult to deduce what happened. The 2003 measurements were limited by a 
different factor. In this case, there was good availability of suitable instruments and 
downlink, but the solar wind sensors were saturated by the high fluxes of solar energetic 
particles. Thus the state of the solar wind and its coupling into the magnetosphere is not 
well known in any of these events. This is a major obstacle to exploring the physics of 
severe space weather events.  
 
We now consider two older events, which provide evidence of stronger space weather 
effects: 
 
23 February 1956. This event exhibited the one of the most intense radiation fluxes that 
has been observed instrumentally. As it precedes the advent of spaceflight, the effects 
were only observed using ground-based instruments. Fortunately, the importance of those 
observations was recognised at the time. They were collated and published as a set of 
short papers by Gold and his colleagues (e.g. Gold and Palmer, 1956; Marsden et al, 
1956). Those observations show an enormous ground-level cosmic ray event for a short 
period, the ground level radiation fluxes were enhanced fifty-fold, which remains the 
largest enhancement ever observed instrumentally. Subsequent analysis of these 
observations suggests that this event was distinguished from other recent radiation storms 
by the hardness of the particle spectrum. The event included significant particles fluxes at 
energies above 1 GeV and thus was capable to delivering significant neutron fluxes to 
ground-level. The event has been widely used as an example of the radiation threat to 
avionics, e.g. Dyer has shown that a repeat could generate single event upset rates greater 
than 1 per minute at 10 km altitude and 1 GeV rigidity cut-off (Dyer, 2002). This would 
put most transatlantic air routes between Europe and North America at severe risk. 
 
This event is an example of an intense radiation storm that was not associated with strong 
geomagnetic activity. There was no elevation of geomagnetic activity during the storm, 
but it was followed by modest storm that started during the following day. This had 
aa*MAX=131, which ranks 165th in the list of storms. 
 
It is also an example of a high flux radiation event with very short duration. As a result 
the fluence (i.e. time-integrated flux) was well below that recorded in major radiation 
storms that have been observed over the past seventy years. It is an event that emphasises 
space weather risks that arise from high fluxes, e.g. single event effects in critical 
electronic systems. These must be distinguished from effects (e.g. cancer risk for 
astronauts) that are linked to total radiation dose and thus are sensitive to fluence rather 
than flux. 
 
1 and 2 September 1859. This is the outstanding space weather event on which we have 
any significant data and was the climax of an extended period of space weather activity 
from 28 August to 9 September 1859. It is often termed the Carrington event in honour of 
Richard Carrington, one of two astronomers who observed the solar flare that initiated the 
event (Carrington, 1859; Hodgson, 1859). These observations marked the discovery of 
solar flares. A huge magnetic storm started some 17 hours after the flare and continued 
for some 36 to 48 hours. This suggests that the solar ejecta (coronal mass ejection) that 
powered the storm travelled at a very high speed (~2400 km s-1). During the storm, bright 
aurorae were observed around the world and reaching down to geomagnetic latitudes as 
low as 20° (Green and Boardsen, 2006). The storm induced strong currents in telegraph 
systems, which were advanced communication system of the time. By 1859 land-based 
telegraph systems had been extensively deployed in Europe and North America and these 
experienced many problems during the storm – see Boteler (2006) for an extensive 
discussion of this issue. We also have a useful set of magnetometer data from 1859. 
Observations made at Kew in London showed that there was sharp 100 nT magnetic 
pulse at the time of the flare (e.g. see Boteler (2006) for a reproduction of the Kew 
magnetometer recordings for the whole storm period). We now recognize this pulse as a 
“magnetic crochet” arising when the flare X-rays enhance the plasma density at altitudes 
around 100 km. At this altitude the ion dynamics are dominated by collisions with 
neutrals but the electron are collisionless. As a result the plasma generates a significant 
cross-field current – and it is this current, enhanced by the flare-induced ionization, that 
produces the magnetic crochet. Another valuable magnetometer observation from the 
Carrington event is the large depression (~1600 nT) in the field observed at Mumbai in 
India (Tsurutani et al, 2003). This is a huge perturbation for station at such low 
geomagnetic latitudes – almost three times larger than seen at any other low latitude 
station and at any other time. Another piece of evidence has emerged from proxy studies, 
specifically studies of gases trapped in ice-cores. These show that a large excess of 
nitrates was trapped in the ice layer deposited in 1859, strongly suggesting that there was 
a massive production of nitrates in Earth’s atmosphere around the time of the Carrington 
space weather event (Shea et al, 2006). The ice core proxy data suggests that the 
Carrington event had the largest fluence of any solar radiation storm of the past 450 
years. 
 
The Carrington event is now widely used as the canonical example of extreme space 
weather. It is a clear example of a very extreme event - in terms of the energetic particle 
radiation reaching the Earth, in terms of the short travel time of the solar ejecta that 
caused the magnetic storm and in the scale of that storm as evidenced by auroral 
observations to very low geomagnetic latitudes. The space weather impact of the event 
was modest – mainly appearing through disruption to telegraph services, which were then 
becoming an important element in medium-distance communications, e.g. between cities 
and across railway networks. The use of electric telegraph for global communications 
was still a decade or two in the future, so the storm had little impact on international 
activities. The other major technologies of that era were not sensitive to space weather. 
These include: 
• Increasing use of steam power for major transport systems with wind power still a 
major factor for maritime transport  
• Maritime navigation based on optical and mechanical devices such as sextants 
and chronometers 
• Universal use of draft animals for short range transport 
• Communication by written documents carried by the above transport systems  
• Well-established use of steam power for industrial machinery but with water and 
wind power still used in some applications such as milling of grain and cloth 
• Intensive use of human physical effort across industry 
• Use of coal for heating of buildings 
• Use of gas derived from coal for lighting  
• Optical telegraph systems for high-speed communications on critical routes– 
though these were gradually being superseded by the electric telegraph 
 
Thus the world of 1859 was dominated by a range of technologies that, with the 
exception of the electric telegraph, were insensitive to space weather. As a result the 
Carrington event was no more than a fascinating nuisance to that world. 
 
The situation today is very different. The technologies of 1859 have gradually been 
retired and replaced by technologies that have improved the standard of living around the 
world – with much of the change taking place over the past forty to fifty years, e.g. the 
move away from steam power in transport systems. Unfortunately, many of these 
technologies have brought a greater sensitivity to space weather especially through use of 
electrical power and space-based infrastructure. There is significant evidence that a repeat 
of the Carrington event would challenge operation of both power grids and spacecraft.  
 
The challenge to power grids would come if the event were to generate geomagnetically 
induced currents over a wide range of latitudes, i.e. beyond the sub-auroral latitudes 
where the worst problems have previously been recorded. These effects could extend to 
lower latitudes where there are large populations and thus widespread societal 
dependence on the reliable operation of electrical power grids. For example, it has been 
estimated that a repeat of the Carrington event could severely damage the US power grid 
with adverse economic impact in the range of one to two trillion dollars (Space Studies 
Board, 2008). 
 
The sensitivity of power grids to severe space weather may further increase as we seek to 
exploit renewable sources of electrical power (solar, wind, tides and hydro) which may 
be located far from population centres. For example, it has been proposed that the future 
architecture of power generation in Europe should exploit solar power systems based in 
Southern Europe and North Africa, plus wind and tidal power systems based on the 
Atlantic margin. This architecture is attractive as it would provide large scale power 
generation while addressing major concerns such climate change and security of supply. 
But it would require long distance transmission of electrical power and thus could be 
vulnerable if a severe space weather storm were to induce currents across Europe and 
down in North Africa. It is therefore important that new power architectures are designed 
to mitigate severe space weather events. 
 
The challenge to spacecraft (and thus to space-based infrastructure for communications, 
navigation and earth surveillance) would come from the severe radiation environment. 
This would have the potential to disrupt and even destroy a large part of the operational 
spacecraft fleet, especially through single events effects such as bit-flipping and latch-up 
and through degradation of solar power arrays. The impact on the global spacecraft fleet 
has been modelled by Odenwald et al (2006). They estimated the global economic impact 
at 44 billion dollars in terms of loss of income from space-based services and 24 billion 
dollars in terms of spacecraft losses. 
 
The Carrington event is a credible example of a severe space weather event. We know in 
outline what happened on 1 and 2 September 1859 and our knowledge of the underlying 
physics tells us that a repeat will happen one day. Indeed, there is no scientific reason to 
exclude the possibility that a bigger event will occur one day. What we don’t know with 
any certainty is the likelihood of a repeat within, say, the next century, let alone the next 
thousand years. This is an open issue that needs further research.  
 
In the mean time we must use the Carrington event as our canonical example of a severe 
space weather event. It provides concrete evidence that the Sun can occasionally produce 
events that will challenge key technologies that have emerged over the past fifty years 
and that are now critical underpinning for the economy and for society as a while.  
4 Assessing the risk from natural hazards 
 
The assessment of risk is a standard approach to the mitigation of severe natural hazards. 
It enables the community at risk to estimate the impact of that hazard long before it 
occurs and thus to consider what actions to take to handle that impact. These may include 
setting standards such that new developments can withstand the hazard, developing 
systems to reduce the impact of hazard on existing developments, preparation and 
validation of procedures to mitigate the impact when it arises. Such assessments are an 
important aspect of modern systems of governance; public authorities increasingly 
require risk assessment for wide range of developments, especially among public and 
private infrastructure. They will often require that new developments are designed to 
withstand local hazards up to some level with the 1 in 100-year risk typically being the 
lowest acceptable level. They will usually require higher standards for design of critical 
infrastructure, e.g. nuclear reactors, where the standard may be the 1 in 1000-year risk 
level. Thus the assessment of risk is central managing natural hazards. These assessments 
are critically underpinned by scientific knowledge of natural hazards and provide the 
means by which that knowledge can drive design standards and thus be used to improve 
the protection offered to humans and the infrastructures on which they depend. 
 
How can we apply these ideas in the domain of space weather? – in particular how can 
we quantify the risks posed by severe space weather events? This is far from easy as we 
have limited information on such events. To demonstrate why this is a problem we first 
look at how risk is assessed in another natural hazard domain – namely flooding due to 
high flow rates on streams and rivers. A key feature of flooding (as with many other well-
known natural hazards) is that is a local, rather than a regional or global, phenomenon. 
Intense rainfall is spatially structured with peak amounts varying markedly on spatial 
scales of just a few kilometres. Thus adjacent river systems can collect very different 
amounts of water and thus experience very different flow rates in the same storm event. 
Thus the flow rates on different rivers are statistically independent – a feature that has 
helped the hydrology community to develop robust statistical methods for assessing risks. 
When assessing the probability of high flow rates on any particular watercourse, it is 
possible to combine historical flow rate data from a number of similar watercourses and 
treat this as a single set of statistically independent data. The data from each watercourse 
must be normalized to the target stream. The combined dataset covers ∑=
s
snN years, 
where sn  is the number of years of data collected on watercourse s and the sum is taken 
over all watercourses. It can then be analysed to determine the distribution of peak flow 
rate against return time and thus estimate what is the likely peak flow rate in any 
particular return time T. For that estimate to be considered reliable the dataset should 
cover at 5T years, i.e. N > 5T. Thus if N > 500 years, the dataset is considered adequate 
to assess the 1-in-100 year risk. This would not be feasible if the analysis were limited to 
the target stream, but is made feasible by the use of statistically independent data from 
multiple streams.  
5 A statistical approach to space weather risks 
 
What happens when we apply this approach to space weather data? We have a number of 
long-term data series that can be analysed to determine the distribution of high values 
against return time. We have done this analysis for two long-term data series: (a) the 
geoeffective electric field in the solar wind, which we can derive at hourly intervals for 
44 years using the OMNI2 solar wind dataset, and (b) the geomagnetic index aa, which is 
available for 141 years. 
 
The results of these analyses are shown in figures 2 and 3 respectively. In both cases we 
have assigned each valid data value to one of a logarithmically-spaced set of bins 
covering the full range of data values. The number of values assigned to each bin is then 
a measure of the occurrence frequency in the range of values covered by the bin. We 
show this occurrence frequency by plotting data points giving the number of values in 
each bin as a function of the lower boundary of the bin. We now look in detail at each 
figure. 
 
Figure 2 shows the occurrence frequency for the geoeffective electric field in the solar 
wind, i.e. Ey = – v × Bz, where v is the solar wind velocity and Bz is the GSM z 
component of the interplanetary magnetic field. The values of Ey were calculated using 
the OMNI2 interplanetary medium dataset from the US National Space Science Center. 
This gives hourly values of v and Bz measured near the Earth from November 1963 to 
the present. The data are necessarily taken from a variety of spacecraft and NSSDC has 
put considerable effort into cross-comparison and normalization of measurements from 
those different sources. It is the best available long-term dataset on the state of the solar 
wind. OMNI2 contains many data gaps due to a variety of problems including lack of 
downlink as well as instrument problems. These gaps can be different for plasma data (v) 
and for magnetic field data (Bz), so we check separately for the availability of valid 
values of v and Bz – and derive Ey only when both inputs are valid.  We also assume v is 
radial from the Sun, so Ey = -vBz and consider only the cases with Bz < 0, i.e. those that 
are significantly geoeffective. We have also applied a lower cut-off to the distribution 
corresponding to the Ey arising from v = 300 km s-1 and Bz = -0.1 nT. The distribution 
below this cut-off is poorly sampled because the logarithmic bins become very small. 
These low values contribute nothing to our understanding of the occurrence of high 
values, so can be neglected. This gives a total of 120822 valid values of Ey over the 
period from 27 November 1963 to 31 December 2008. Thus we have valid data for 31% 
of the possible samples; this should be compared with a theoretical maximum of 50% 
(given the requirement that Bz <0).  
 
Figure 2 shows a surprisingly smooth distribution peaking around Ey = 1 mV m-1, which 
corresponds to a potential of 100 kV when applied over the 100000 km scale size of the 
magnetosphere. This is consistent with the cross-cap potential often observed in the polar 
ionosphere in moderately disturbed conditions (e.g. through plasma flow measurements 
with SuperDARN) and which theory suggests is a separate measure of the solar wind 
potential applied to the magnetosphere. Above the peak, the distribution tends to a 
power-law as shown by the sloping line. This is a power law fit to the top 15 points in the 
distribution (Ey > 2.4 mV m-1) and has a spectral index of -2.9. The two horizontal lines 
in Figure 2 indicate occurrence frequencies of 1 per 11 years (i.e. the average solar cycle 
duration) and of 1 per century. In principle we can use the intersection of the power law 
with these lines to estimate the maximum value of Ey expected per solar cycle and per 
century. However, you can immediately see that these would be poor estimates that 
cannot be relied on. The maximum value for a solar cycle is heavily determined by just 
two large data values (out of 120822) while the centennial maximum is an extrapolation 
well beyond all available data. These maxima are based on a mathematical fit to the data 
with little regard to physics, e.g. they provide no insight into physical factors that might 
limit the maximum value of Ey. 
 
Figure 3 shows the occurrence frequency for the geomagnetic index aa. These were taken 
from the UK Solar System Data Centre and are available as a continuous series of three-
hourly values from January 1868 to the present. It is the best available long-term dataset 
on the state of the occurrence of geomagnetic activity. This index is available in both 
final and provisional forms; we used the final form whenever available, and the 
provisional form when only that was available. This gives a total of 413528 valid values 
of aa over the period from 1 January 1868 to 11 July 2009. Thus we have valid data for 
100% of the possible samples.  
 
Figure 3 shows a noisy distribution at low values (aa < 15) but is smoother at higher 
values. The noisiness at low values is probably an artefact of the logarithmic bin sizes as 
discussed above – and, as in that discussion, has little relevance to our understanding of 
the occurrence frequency of high values. The overall distribution lacks a clear peak, is 
flat-topped at low values and shows a linear decrease at high values. Its form is 
suggestive of a Lorentzian distribution and the dashed line shows how such a distribution 
can be fitted to the data. This fit suggests that the high values follow a power law with 
spectral index -2.7. As in the previous figure the two horizontal lines indicate occurrence 
frequencies of 1 per 11 years and of 1 per century – and thus can provide an estimate of 
the maximum aa value expected on those timescale. And, as before, you can see that 
these maxima would be poor estimates that cannot be relied on. 
 
The fundamental issue we face is that space weather is a global phenomenon, so 
measurements of relevant parameters on and around the Earth (such as Ey and aa, but 
also many others) are statistically correlated. Thus we cannot combine them to synthesise 
very long data series as is done in the assessment of other natural hazards. Thus the 
statistical approach is constrained by the limited duration of solar-terrestrial datasets. We 
really need 500 years of observations if we wish to assess the 1-in-100 years risk, but 
most of the STP datasets are much shorter than that. Among those datasets that are 
closely linked to geomagnetic activity we currently have 45 years of solar wind data, 78 
years of ionospheric data and 140 to 160 years of geomagnetic data. These all fall far 
short of the required duration. The sunspot number data series is longer ranging from 180 
years at daily resolution to 400 years for annual means. This is a useful indicator of the 
general level of solar activity but is not a measure of space weather events at the Earth.  
6 Other approaches to space weather risks 
6.1 Proxy data 
 
One way to build longer time series datasets is to look for proxy data – something in the 
terrestrial environment whose attributes reflect the conditions prevailing when that thing 
was formed. One relevant example is the production of cosmogenic isotopes by the 
interaction of energetic particle radiation with the atmosphere. If those isotopes are 
trapped in an independently dateable deposit (e.g. annual ice layers in the permanent ice-
sheets), they can be used to estimate the radiation fluence impinging on the Earth in the 
year of deposit. This technique has been used to estimate radiation fluences over the past 
several hundred years and continues to provide insights into the occurrence of major 
radiation events (Shea et al, 2006). Thus proxy data are becoming a powerful tool for 
assessing the historical occurrence of high fluence radiation events. However, we should 
note that they do not provide information on short-live very high flux events such as that 
on 23 February 1956, as discussed above. 
6.2 Space weather in other solar systems 
 
However, as yet, no proxy has been identified that can provide information on the 
historical levels of geomagnetic activity. Thus we have to find other methods for 
assessing the many aspects of space weather that arise from geomagnetic activity. One 
possibility here is to try to observe space weather in similar solar systems. If that were 
possible, we would have statistically independent measurements of space weather and 
could begin to follow the statistical approach used to study local natural hazards such as 
flooding. In essence we would have put space weather in a larger context where it 
becomes a local phenomenon. This makes the approach attractive but very challenging. 
The target solar  systems must have a single star that is similar to the Sun, i.e. spectral 
type G, a significant convection zone in the outer part of the star in order to provide a 
dynamo for generation of magnetic fields, and a similar rotation rate to drive that 
dynamo. There are a number of such systems within 100 light-years of Earth and 
advances in astronomical instrumentation are opening up possibilities to observe space 
weather phenomena in those systems. For example, stellar flares have long been observed 
using space-based X-ray instruments. However, much astronomical observing has 
focused on more powerful objects and thus there is limited knowledge of flares on G-type 
stars. But there is little to stop the development of a suitable observing programme other 
than the need to obtain adequate telescope time. 
 
Another space weather phenomenon that we might observe in other solar systems is the 
cyclotron maser emission from aurora on magnetised planets in those solar systems. This 
is the phenomenon known as auroral kilometric radiation at Earth and its intensity 
responds to the level of space activity in the magnetosphere. There is already 
considerable interest in observing cyclotron maser emission from exo-planets as it will 
provide a means to identify magnetised exo-planets and thus worlds that have some 
protection from cosmic radiation and from atmospheric erosion by stellar winds. Work in 
this area suggests that cyclotron maser emission from exo-planets will be observable by 
the next generation of radio telescopes such as LOFAR and SKA (Zarka, 2007). 
However, the frequency cut-off imposed by Earth’s ionosphere will probably limit 
observations to larger-exo-planets with emissions in the MHz range. Observations of 
cyclotron maser emissions from Earth-like planets will probably require deployment of a 
sensitive low-frequency radio telescope in space or on the Moon (Lockwood, 2007). 
 
Thus there is some potential to study space weather in other solar systems – and to use 
those observations to improve our statistical assessment of extreme space weather events. 
However, this is necessarily a long-term project as the techniques are in their infancy and, 
even when they are mature, it will take some years to build up an adequate dataset. This 
is a technique that will come to fruition in the middle of the 21st century. 
6.3 Physics-based modelling 
 
The previous sections have shown that we have limited opportunities to assess the risks 
of extreme space weather via statistical analysis of observations. We therefore consider 
whether the modelling of space weather can provide an alternative means of assessing 
risk. In principle, we can use modelling to explore a range of space weather scenarios 
from quiet to moderate to extreme conditions and thereby accumulate information that 
would require centuries if we had to wait for nature to provide examples. However, this 
approach will work only if the modelling properly describes extreme conditions. This is 
essentially a requirement for the models to be physics-based and, in particular, to capture 
the physics at work in extreme events. We cannot use numerical models for this purpose 
as they are reliable only under average conditions (e.g. key inputs within a few standard 
deviations of the mean) and often generate bizarre results when presented with extreme 
conditions, far beyond those used to build the model. These results do not indicate a 
failure of the numerical model, but rather its inappropriate use.  
 
Thus we seek to identify some of the key physics at work in extreme events and thereby 
identify areas that should be key targets for research on space weather models. In normal 
conditions, the magnetosphere mitigates the space weather effects induced by the solar 
wind and by cosmic radiation. These effects are reduced as they propagate into the closed 
magnetic field lines that envelope most of the Earth’s surface, atmosphere and near-Earth 
space. Only the polar regions, where the magnetic field lines are usually open to the 
interplanetary medium, are exposed to the worst effects. During severe geomagnetic 
storms, there is a huge increase in the amount of open magnetic flux, so that the magnetic 
field lines at mid, or even low, latitudes become open to the solar wind. This is clearly 
demonstrated by the huge expansion of the auroral oval during severe storms. It is this 
expansion that generates many adverse space weather effects. The auroral electrojet will 
be moved to mid-latitudes greatly increasing the risk of geomagnetically induced currents 
in those regions. The presence of aurora at mid-latitudes will also have adverse effects on 
trans-ionospheric radio propagation, e.g. particle precipitation will alter the structure of 
the E region ionosphere, increased turbulence will generate strong scintillation effects. 
Auroral heating will change the density and composition of the mid-latitude 
thermosphere leading to changes to spacecraft drag and in the structure of the F region 
ionosphere. 
 
An expansion of the region of open flux cannot be achieved just by increasing the speed 
and density of the solar wind, i.e. higher ram pressure. That pressure will just compress 
the magnetosphere; it will not increase the open flux. It will increase the level of activity 
in polar regions, but the magnetosphere will still reduce the impact of that activity as it 
propagates equatorward. Thus we need to consider the processes that control the open 
flux in the Earth’s magnetosphere. Let us consider a simple model in which the amount 
of open flux is determined by the competition between (a) reconnection on the dayside 
magnetopause, which creates open flux, and (b) reconnection in the tail plasmasheet, 
which removes open flux. The rate of change of open flux is then given by the balance 
between these two reconnection processes and may be summarised by the following 
equation: 
ttt
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To open up the magnetosphere, as observed in severe geomagnetic storms, we need the 
first term on the right to be large and the second to be weak. The first term, the dayside 
reconnection rate, is equivalent to the potential applied to the magnetosphere by the 
convective electric field in the solar wind, i.e. 
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where vsw is the solar wind speed, Bz is the north-south component of the interplanetary 
magnetic field and L is the magnetospheric scale size over which the solar wind electric 
field is applied. The magnetospheric scale size is fixed (~100000 km), so to make this 
first term very large, we require a high solar wind speed vsw and a magnetic field 
component Bz that is strongly southward. Experience shows that the credible range of 
values includes vsw in excess of 2000 km s-1 and Bz below -50 nT. This is sufficient to 
produce very high dayside reconnection with the solar wind applying a potential in 
excess of 10 million volts. If this were not balanced by tail reconnection, it would rapidly 
expand the open flux (as we shall discuss below) and produce the effects reported during 
severe geomagnetic storms. But for this mechanism to be effective, the tail reconnection 
rate must remain low for a sufficient time (perhaps five to ten minutes) to allow strong 
dayside reconnection to expand the region of open flux to mid-latitudes. Note that once 
the region of open flux has been expanded, it can remain large if dayside reconnection 
continues and balances any increases in tail reconnection rates as the storm proceeds. It 
will shrink only when dayside reconnection decreases to levels that allow tail 
reconnection to dominate.  
 
Thus to understand how the region of open flux might be expanded, we must consider 
what process might act, during a severe storm, to slow tail reconnection without slowing 
dayside reconnection. There are several factors to consider: 
 
• First, and most obvious, there is a natural time delay between the onset of dayside 
reconnection and the subsequent onset of tail reconnection. The solar wind electric 
field drives the transport of open flux to the tail. Thus tail reconnection will 
commence only after a time delay that can be no smaller than the flux transport time 
from the dayside. If the flux is transported at the solar wind speed, this time T is of 
order (Rd + Rt)/ Vsw, where Rd and Rt are the distances of the dayside and tail 
reconnection regions from Earth. If we take Rd = Rt = 10 Re, we find T is around 5 
minutes for normal solar wind speeds of 400 km s-1, decreasing to 1 minute for a high 
solar wind speed of 2000 km s-1. This is too small to allow the required expansion of 
open flux.  
• However, the transport of open flux may be slowed significantly below the solar wind 
speed. The solar wind electric field will generate Hall and Pedersen currents at the 
foot of open flux tubes and these currents will dissipate energy due to the finite 
conductivity in that region. This dissipation will slow flux transport and will be 
particularly marked during severe events. If we assume that the solar wind velocity 
maps down field lines to the ionosphere as the inverse square of the magnetic field 
strength, the example above (vsw > 2000 km s-1 and Bz < -50 nT) would imply a 
plasma flow velocity > 60 km s-1 in the ionosphere. This is an order of magnitude 
greater than the highest velocities usually seen in severe events. It is likely that 
ionospheric dissipation would significantly slow flux transport to the tail in severe 
events and thus increase the time delay before the onset of tail reconnection. A more 
detailed assessment of this process is beyond the aims of this paper, but it appears to 
be a mechanism that could operate in severe geomagnetic storms and one that could 
create the time delay needed to enable dayside reconnection to expand the region of 
open flux to mid-latitudes. Incidentally this dissipation will cause severe heating of 
the upper atmosphere and many space weather effects will follow from that. 
• We should also consider if there are any mechanisms that could directly interfere with 
the tail reconnection process and reduce the effectiveness with which it destroys open 
flux. Efficient reconnection requires that plasma on newly reconnected flux tubes can 
freely flow away from the reconnection region. If not, the pressure from this outflow 
plasma will gradually slow and eventually halt the reconnection process. Thus we 
should consider if there are any processes that can choke the outflow from tail 
reconnection and that might come into prominence during severe storms. It is 
doubtful that there will be any changes in magnetic topology that could choke the 
outflow. But it is possible that increased mass loading of the tail plasma could have a 
similar effect. The onset of dayside reconnection will quickly be followed by strong 
geomagnetic activity in the ionospheric cusp region and this is likely to include strong 
outflows of ionospheric ions, in particular O+ ions. The penetration of the solar wind 
electric field into the magnetosphere will quickly transport those ions to the tail and 
keep them from flowing back to the dayside reconnection region. Thus it is possible 
that the plasma in the tail reconnection region will quickly be loaded with extra mass. 
The increased mass density is likely to slow the reconnection rate since a given 
energy release by reconnection must then accelerate the outflow plasma to lower 
velocities.  
 
Thus there are several possible mechanisms that by which tail reconnection might be 
slowed in severe space weather events. Further work is needed to quantify these 
mechanisms, but they support the idea that tail reconnection can be slowed sufficiently 
that dayside reconnection will dominate in early phase of a severe geomagnetic storm. If 
so, how long would it take to create the highly expanded region of open flux that appears 
to be a characteristic of severe geomagnetic storms? We can estimate this using a dipole 
model of the Earth’s magnetic field. Figure 4 shows the amount of magnetic flux 
poleward of any latitude for a dipole of strength 7.64 x 1022 Am-2 (this is the dipole 
strength corresponding to the primary term (g10) in Version 10 of the International 
Geomagnetic Reference Field, see http://www.ngdc.noaa.gov/IAGA/vmod/igrf.html). 
Figure 4 shows that, away from the polar region, the variation of magnetic flux with 
latitude is almost linear with 108 webers of flux per degree of latitude. Thus, if a severe 
space weather event can generate a dayside reconnection voltage of 10 million volts as 
discussed above, we would expect the region of open flux to grow by 0.1° every second. 
Thus an expansion of the open flux boundary from 70° (its typical location at moderate 
activity) to 45° would take just over four minutes. This would expand the open flux to 
envelope all of Northern Europe and much of the North America and put a wide range of 
services at greatly increased risk from space weather. Further expansion would quickly (a 
few minutes) increase the risks in the many other populous regions closer to the equator. 
 
We conclude that the rapid expansion of the open flux in Earth’s magnetosphere is one of 
the key factors in determining the risks from severe space weather events, in particular 
for the many impacts that arise from severe geomagnetic activity. Thus to advance our 
understanding of these risk, we need to better understand the physical processes that will 
control the expansion of open flux in severe events. These include: 
• Better understanding of the occurrence of the relevant conditions in the interplanetary 
medium, i.e. high solar wind speeds and strong southward magnetic fields. 
• The extent to which dissipation in the polar ionosphere can slow the tailward 
transport of newly reconnected flux tubes, in particular the extent to which this might 
be enhanced during severe conditions.  
• The extent to which ion outflows from Earth’s upper atmosphere can modify tail 
dynamics, in particular slowing tail reconnection. 
We need to understand the physics behind these processes and to incorporate that 
knowledge in space weather models so that they can be used to better simulate severe 
events and inform risk assessments. 
7 Summary and conclusions 
 
There is an urgent need to develop methods for quantifying the risks from severe space 
weather. Recent scientific work (Space Studies Board, 2008) suggests that the maximum 
credible risk from severe space weather would be very damaging for our modern 
technological civilisation. This risk has emerged in the past forty or fifty years as society 
has become increasingly dependent on services that exploit space-based infrastructure 
and long-distance transmission of electricity. 
 
However, severe space weather falls in the category of low frequency high impact risks. 
These are rare events that only occur once in many decades, but with catastrophic 
consequences. Their low frequency presents a challenge to most systems of governance 
since these usually focus on immediate problems and pay attention to longer-term 
problems only when the consequences are made clear. Thus it is vital to raise awareness 
among policy-makers about the consequences of severe space weather events and of the 
likelihood of such events occurring in any particular time frame. The recent scientific 
advances in describing the consequences of a severe space weather event have raised 
public awareness about the problem, e.g. through articles in popular science magazines. 
However, much of that public awareness has focused on the specific risk at the next solar 
maximum – and lacks the scientific perspective that this is a risk that will continue 
forever but modulated by changes in solar activity.  
 
It is therefore important to quantify the risks from severe space weather events and, in 
particular, to develop risk assessment methodologies that parallel those used to assess 
other natural hazards. This should produce quantitative results that will be meaningful to 
policy-makers. As noted by Fisher (2009) it is essential that space weather know-how is 
presented to policy-makers in ways that are credible, salient and legitimate. We argue 
here that a natural hazards approach to space weather risks (i.e. establishing robust 
estimates of occurrence frequency of high levels of space weather activity) is a critical 
step in that process. 
 
This paper explores the statistical approach to natural hazards, using flood risk 
assessment as an exemplar of that approach. We show that it is mathematically possible 
to estimate the occurrence frequency of high levels of some key space weather 
parameters (specifically the convective electric field in the solar wind and the 
geomagnetic index aa). However, these estimates are not robust even at the level of 1-in-
100 year risks because current STP datasets are far too short. Such estimates require time 
series measurements with an effective duration that is more than 500 years. For many 
other natural hazards, these time series can be synthesised by combining shorter time 
series from statistically independent instances of similar hazards. But that is not currently 
possible for space weather. We have substantial data series only for a single instance of 
space weather, namely solar activity on the earthward face of the Sun and its 
consequences on or near the Earth.  These datasets are highly correlated, so we are 
limited to the duration for which relevant measurements are available, ranging from 45 
years for conditions in the interplanetary medium to 140 to 170 years for geomagnetic 
measurements. If we confine our interest to such measurements we will have to wait 
several centuries to accumulate sufficient data. 
 
We therefore examine alternative methods for making robust estimates of risk, assess 
their potential and suggest what future work is needed to deliver that potential. One 
alternative method is the use of proxy data. This is already an established approach for 
estimating historical radiation environment. It is already delivering important results, e.g. 
suggesting that the Carrington space weather event also included the outstanding solar 
radiation storm of the past several centuries. We can expect that work in this area will 
continue and is likely to provide further important results. However, there is as yet no 
proven method for using proxy data to quantify the strength of historical geomagnetic 
storms. It is possible that historical records may provide information on the latitudinal 
extent of major storms, but such records can be biased by a variety of factors including 
human error, weather and partial loss of records. An environmental proxy would enable 
systematic studies, but, as yet, no suitable feature has been identified. 
 
A more speculative alternative method is to observe space weather phenomena in other 
solar systems similar to our own. This would give us access to statistically independent 
instances of space weather and thus open up the possibility to synthesise long time series 
by combining data from those instances. However, this is a challenging requirement at 
the present time. We can observe flares on other stars using modern X-ray telescopes but 
a systematic flare survey of Sun-like stars would require large amounts of time on those 
telescopes. Another technique that we must consider is to observe cyclotron master 
emissions from magnetised planets in similar solar systems. These are very strong radio 
emissions generated by the electrons that produce the aurora seen on magnetised planets 
so are well-correlated with the level of geomagnetic activity. Thus measurements of the 
strength of these emissions will provide a measure of the level of that activity – and one 
that can easily be compared with activity at the Earth. There is already considerable 
scientific interest in these emissions as they provide a way of detecting magnetised exo-
planets. This has shown that the detection of these emissions should be within reach of 
radio telescopes within a decade or two – and also that it would be better to make such 
measurements in space so that we can observe the low frequency (<1 MHz) emissions 
from Earth-like exo-planets. We conclude that the observation of space weather 
phenomena in similar solar systems is an area that is ripe for development and has 
significant potential to help us assess the extremes of geomagnetic activity. It is an area 
that will grow in importance in the coming decades. 
 
Another important alternative method is the use of physics-based modelling. If we could 
build space weather models that can reliably simulate extreme conditions, we would be 
able to use the simulations to assess the risks from those conditions. This approach offers 
the great advantage that we do not have to wait decades or even centuries to collect an 
adequate dataset. The challenge is to be confident that we have a reliable simulation of 
extreme conditions. Numerical models cannot be used as the applicability of any such 
model is inextricably tied to the average conditions within the dataset used to derive the 
model. For the reasons discussed throughout this paper, this cannot include an adequate 
sample of extreme conditions. It is therefore vital to use physics-based models and, 
furthermore, models that capture the key physics at work in extreme conditions. What is 
this key physics? We argue here that a major increase in open flux in Earth’s 
magnetosphere is a key feature of severe space weather events at Earth. This expansion 
of open flux brings strong space weather effects to mid-latitudes and thus greatly 
increases the space weather risk in many heavily-populated regions. It causes bright 
aurora to be visible in these regions – a phenomenon that is well-attested in historical 
records. This expansion would require a short period of very strong dayside reconnection 
with little or no tail reconnection. In extreme solar wind conditions, this period could be 
quite short – just four minutes could be enough to expand the open-closed boundary from 
70° to 45° latitude. Once expanded, all that is required to maintain the region of open flux 
is a balance between dayside and tail reconnection; this region will shrink only when 
dayside reconnection stops, thus allowing tail reconnection to remove open flux. Thus the 
key physics that we need to understand includes: (a) the occurrence of solar wind 
conditions that drive strong dayside reconnection (i.e. high solar wind speed and strongly 
southward IMF); and (b) the processes that can slow the onset of tail reconnection during 
the onset phase of a severe geomagnetic storm. This is an area where future research can 
give insights into the physics of extreme space weather. Key issues to consider include 
the effect of ionospheric dissipation on the tailward transport of newly opened magnetic 
flux and the modulation of tail reconnection rates due to mass-loading, e.g. O+ outflows 
from the upper atmosphere.  
 
In summary, this paper outlines several research approaches that can help us develop 
methods to quantify the risks from extreme space weather – in particular, to put those 
risks in a natural hazards framework, e.g. to estimate the occurrence rates for high levels 
of space weather activity. This quantitative information is a critical scientific input to the 
growing policy debate on the economic and societal impact of severe space weather. It 
will help policy-makers assess the priority that should be given to protection against 
severe space weather. 
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Appendix A: aa*MAX 
 
This index has been developed at the US National Geophysical Data Center as a way to 
assess the severity of geomagnetic storms. It is based on the well-known aa geomagnetic 
index, for which we have values back to 1868, but uses a running mean technique to 
provide a robust estimate of the strength and duration of each storm. The basic aa values 
are available at 3-hourly intervals. Thus individual data points are more indicative of the 
strength of individual sub-storms rather than the intensity of the overall storm. The aa 
index is also produced as daily values, i.e. the arithmetic mean of the eight 3-hourly 
values within a day as defined by Coordinated Universal Time and its predecessors. This 
provides a better estimate of the intensity of storm activity on a particular day, but is 
sensitive to the phasing of the storm. A storm that fills one UTC day will have a higher 
index than a similar storm that runs from mid-day to mid-day. 
 
The aa*MAX index is intended to overcome this. It is based on an 8-point running mean 
(aa*) of the 3-hourly aa index, i.e. a 24 hour average that integrates over many sub-
storms but is not constrained in phase. The duration of the storm is then taken as the 
period for which aa* is greater than 60, while the peak value of the running mean is 
aa*MAX, an estimate of overall strength of the storm. 
 
Full details of aa*MAX, together with a complete set of values, are available on the 
NGDC website. At the time of writing, the set of values contains one wrongly identified 
storm, which has been ignored in this paper. This is an event listed as being on 10/11 
May 2003 and ranked third highest in the values of aa*MAX. This event is spurious and 
arises from incorrect values of aa for 10 May 2003, which are now being corrected by the 
International Service for Geomagnetic Indices. 
Figure captions 
 
Figure 1. The variation of the four auroral electrojet indices before, during and after the 
severe geomagnetic storm on 13/14 March 1989. 
 
Figure 2. Occurrence frequency for values of the geoeffective electric field in the solar 
wind using hourly data for 1963 to 2008. The frequency is shown as the count in each 
logarithmically space bin. 
 
Figure 3. Occurrence frequency for values of the geomagnetic index aa using 3-hourly 
data from 1868 to 2009. The frequency is shown as the count in each logarithmically 
space bin. 
 
Figure 4. The amount of magnetic flux poleward of any magnetic latitude for a magnetic 
dipole.of 7.64 x 1022 Am-2, i.e. similar to the Earth’s dipole moment in 2005. The flux is 
shown in gigawebers. 
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